Abstract. Systemic risk in banking systems is a crucial issue that remains to be completely addressed. In our toy model, banks are exposed to two sources of risks, namely, market risk from their investments in assets external to the system and credit risk from their lending in the interbank market. By and large, both risks increase during severe financial turmoil. Under this scenario, the paper shows how both the individual and the systemic default tend to coincide.
Introduction
Understanding of the interplay among banks through several channels is a crucial issue in the globalized world economy [1, 2] . In general, banks obtain their profits from the difference between deposit interest rates and interest rates in the interbank markets, stock markets, credit markets, and so on. Of course, money flows and interest rates are deeply related to international economies.
It is recognized that systemic risks are created by interconnection among banks. These systemic risks probably result from the positive feedback loop among financial markets and banks' interactions. They can be formed by several reasons such as leverage trading, trend follower's trading, lose cut trading, bankruptcy of banks, bunched sales, housing market and real economy, employment, excess concentration of wealth, a trade imbalance, political power, extreme low interest rates, excessive or lack of regulation and so forth.
Several types of nonlinear positive feedback mechanism can concurrently trigger serious crashes damaging all the financial systems. In this study, we attempt to estimate systemic risks among banks under exposures of risky assets traded in a stock market.
Fluctuations of price movements in the financial markets have been studied by many researchers [3, 4] . Stochastic models as well as agent-based models are well-studied [5, 6] . Some researchers pay a significant attention to the network effects in the financial markets [7, 8] . From empirical studies on financial time series, asset price fluctuations follow fat-tailed distributions. This is often modeled as a random number drawn from a student t distribution [1, 9, 10] . However, since asset price fluctuations are generated from trading by market participants, high volatility regimes are not independent of banks behavior.
How does banks' behavior affect financial markets and do the asset price fluctuations influence banks' behavior? This forms a circular causality. This is a main question of this study. To do so, we consider a toy model of interaction among banks by means of an agent-based model. We assume that banks have lending and borrowing relationships with other banks and invest their money to a kind of asset. We focus on two viewpoints: capital adequacy ratio and interaction between a lending and borrowing network and financial markets.
Banks
We assume that the bank holds n i (t) units of risky assets with their market price S(t) and cash C i (t) at time t. Therefore, the value of risky asset is estimated as
Since the bank is initially financed by their bank depositors, we assume that n i (0) > 0 and C i (0) > 0. The bank deposit is described as D i , which is a constant value. If the i-th bank buys V i (t) units of risky asset then n i (t) = n i (t − ∆t) + V i (t) and
Also, a lending and borrowing relationship exists among banks. Such a relationship can be described as asymmetric weighted matrix. Let W ij (t) be expressed as a lending amount from the bank i to the bank j at time t. The bank debt of the i-th bank at time t is estimated as L i (t) = N j=1 W ji (t), and the bank credit of the i-th bank at time t is estimated as K i (t) = N j=1 W ij (t). Therefore, the survival condition of the i-th bank is given by
then the i-th bank goes bankruptcy. We assume that the debt of i-th bank for any j-th bank is lost. This can be expressed as temporal development of interconnection among banks. The update rule of W ji (t) is given for all i as
If we can simulate the agent-based model repeatedly, then from the relative frequency we can estimate the default probability of the i-th bank as
where M sim is the number of simulations,
is the number of defaults for the i-th bank. The bank i must pay money to both depositors with deposit interest rates and lenders with interest rates in the interbank market every step. Such payments write
where λ D represents the deposit interest rate, and λ I the interest rate in the interbank market. We assume that the interest rate is given by
where ∆t is measured in daily. In the case that the annual interest rate is 1% and ∆t = 1 [day], the daily interest rate is estimated as 2.67262 × 10 −5 . Capital requirements are designed to ensure that banks hold enough resources to absorb shocks to their balance sheets. A standard measure of the health of individual banks is their capital adequacy ratio (CAR). Introduced in 1988 with the Basel I Accord, the CAR is calculated as the total regulatory capital of a bank divided by its risk-weighted assets. The Basel II revision refined the calculation of risk weights and incorporated three major components of risk: credit, operational, and market risk. The Basel II revision also set the minimum CAR at 6 percent. Conservatively-run banks tend to have high CARs to cushion against higher losses. In addition, Basel III revision introduced that a Total Capital Ratio to total Risk Weighted Assets should be larger than 9 % (The Minimum Tier 1 Capital Ratio is 7 % and the Minimum Tier 2 Capital Ratio is 2 %).
Bank capital to assets is the ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets. Capital and reserves include funds contributed by owners, retained earnings, general and special reserves, provisions, and valuation adjustments. Capital includes tier 1 capital (paid-up shares and common stock), which is a common feature in all countries' banking systems, and total regulatory capital, which includes several specified types of subordinated debt instruments that need not be repaid if the funds are required to maintain minimum capital levels (these comprise tier 2 and tier 3 capital). Total assets include all non-financial and financial assets. CAR is defined as CAR = (Tier 1 capital) + (Tier 2 capital) (Risk weighted assets) ,
where Tier 1 capital T 1 is defined as The risk-weight depends on kinds of assets. In the case of cash and government securities, the weight is 0%. Mortgage loans have 50% weight. Other loans and assets have 100% weight. In the case of our model, the capital adequacy ratio is approximated as
The second Basel Accords imposes the requirement such that CAR i (t) ≥ 4.5. The third Basel Accords will require CAR i (t) ≥ 6. 
Market mechanism
The risky assets are traded through a common market. The bank traders buy and sell their risky assets. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the investment attitude in the financial market is determined on the basis of the last change in the market price.
The market participants are classified into two types; trend followers and contrarians. The trend followers are traders who want to buy (sell) assets when their price goes up (down). The contrarians are traders who want to buy (sell) assets when their price goes down (up). Suppose that N banks trade a single asset. It is assumed that the banks can take three investment attitudes coded as three states (buying: 1, selling: -1, and waiting: 0):
where a i is a parameter which determines behavior of banks. If a i > 0, then the i-th bank is a trend follower. If a i < 0, then the i-th bank is a contrarian. θ 1i and θ 2i are parameters of the i-th bank (θ 1i < θ 2i ). The value of σ(> 0) represents the uncertainty of decision. These are models of response curves between perception (price change) and three types of investment attitudes. We use these curves that relate a price change to investment attitude. Fig. 2 shows the probabilities for three investment attitude. The probabilities can be adjusted by using θ 1i , θ 2i , a and σ. Specifically, θ 1i and θ 2i are parameters to describe a range of unresponsiveness to the price change. While θ 1i normally takes negative values, θ 2i takes positive values. The mode of p (0) (R) is equivalent to (θ 1i + θ 2i )/2. If we differ |θ 1 | from |θ 2 |, then we can express asymmetric response of price changes to investment attitudes. This is also understood from probit-logit reasoning.
Furthermore, it is assumed that excess demand for a risky asset N i=1 V i (t)y i (t) drives the market price. The volume traded by the bank i is assumed to be proportional to its amount of equity:
where η is an investment ratio taking from 0 to 1. To guarantee positive market prices, the following log return is chosen: and the log returns are proportional to the excess demand,
where γ is a positive constant to represent the response of the return to the excess demand. This constant is associated with the price elasticity. From Eqs. (13) and (14), we have
After the bank trades stocks, the bank's amount of cash and the holding number of stocks is updated. For the buy side, if C i (t) ≥ V i (t)S(t) then
For the sell side, if n i (t) ≥ V i (t) then
4 Debt exposure
The i-th bank has equity
is less than zero, we define that the i-th bank goes bankrupt. Let us assume that a symmetric weighted matrix W ij (t) describes a lending and borrowing relationship among banks at time t. The debt of the i-th bank is estimated as
The default impact of the bank j at time t is denoted as
be a cumulative loss of the bank i in the n-th iteration. If we introduce a binary variable h
, then the cumulative losses of the bank i can be calculated as
where W (n) ij is updated as
with the initial conditions given by
If the cumulative loss Q (n) i of the bank i becomes greater than its equity E i (t)
then we recognize that the bank i goes bankrupt and set h
i . We obtain the new matrix at time t + ∆t as
Our interest is to understand the total losses over all the banks triggered by the default of the bank j, which is estimated as the total losses
under the initial condition h
is assumed to be the economic value of the bank j.
Simulation
In order to compute this algorithm, we set parameters as shown in Tab. 1. We also selected the total cash possessed by banks at time t defined as
and the total number of stocks held by banks at time t computed by
as representative quantities describing conditions of banks. The ratio of the trend followers to the total traders
where N t is the number of trend followers, is used as an order parameter of this market. We can control α by changing a 0 . Fig. 3 shows the market prices at (a) α = 0.53, (b) α = 0.62, (c) α = 0.76, and (d) α = 0.81. The duration of these plots corresponds to 100 years (36500 days). Fig. 4 shows the total amount of cash and Fig. 5 shows the total amount of risky assets.
When the market price goes down, the total amount of risky assets decreases and the total amount of losses increases. This situation can be confirmed at α = 0.62 and α = 0.76. If the ratio of the contraians to the total traders increases, then price movement seems to be mean-reverting. In the case of α = 0.53, the volatility seems to be smaller than other cases.
The cumulative losses H(t) is shown in Fig. 6 . It is said that if many banks are contrarian the price movement is moderate and the total amount of losses is less than more volatile cases. Before the banks went bankrupt, value of CAR becomes steeply small. Therefore, the default probability should be a function of CAR, which is not homogeneous. In general, a market where contrarians are dominant shows mean-reverting price movements, and a market where trend followers are dominant makes the market price volatile. However, CAR of the contrarians tends to decrease and CAR of the trend followers tends to increase.
Conclusion
We emphasized the fact that in our proposed model we were able to capture the relation between banks behavior and asset prices. We described the positive feedback-loop between banks default probability and asset price dynamics. The results showed that the procyclical banks' behaviors (i.e., feedback loop between default probability and asset prices) can explain the realization of asset price bubbles and their burst. The characteristic of the interbank market plays in this context a minor role if exposures in financial markets are larger than capital in an interbank network. From this view, the interbank market simply allows us to condense the individual default probabilities into the systemic default probability. The capital adequacy ratio (Leverage ratio) is a useful indicator to monitor the default probability.
As future work, we need to check our hypothesis against data. For example, how much stock, cash, and interbank lending do main banks hold? If the exposure to financial markets is larger than an interbank network, then our hypothesis is justified. 
